fix(api): bound what a forged CF-Connecting-IP can buy

Code review, both findings valid.

The design doc claimed Cloudflare "replaces the header, so a browser
cannot forge it", and that only the X-Forwarded-For fallback was
forgeable. That is true only for traffic that actually passed through
Cloudflare, and nothing in this process can verify that it did. Reaching
the origin directly, both headers are equally attacker-controlled — and
rotating CF-Connecting-IP mints a fresh rate-limit bucket per request,
defeating per-client limits on every endpoint including the
DataFrame-heavy /api/schools. Against abuse that is worse than the
shared bucket it replaced, which at least capped everyone together.

So the ceiling comes back. I dropped it earlier arguing it belonged at
Cloudflare; that argument assumed the keying was sound, and it is not.
GlobalRateLimitMiddleware counts all /api/ traffic in a fixed window
against a total, independent of client identity, outermost so it refuses
before any work happens. Written by hand because slowapi cannot express
a global cap: default_limits and application_limits are both keyed by
key_func, and the latter needs middleware this app does not install.

It does not make the header trustworthy — it makes trusting it
survivable. The real fix is Authenticated Origin Pulls or an origin
firewall, now documented in DEPLOY.md as the open gap it is.

127.0.0.1 is exempt: the healthcheck curls localhost from inside the
container, and starving it would restart the container and turn a load
spike into an outage loop. Keyed on the peer address, never the Host
header, which the caller sets.

Second finding: suggest_schools_typesense promised "never raises" while
the parsing loop sat outside the try, so int(None) on a malformed
document would have made a keystroke a 500. The loop now skips bad rows
rather than dropping the whole list — and a hit with no document no
longer becomes a suggestion pointing at /school/0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015mWQnpye9F299NVRCCSRvj

backend/tests/test_rate_limit_key.py

@@ -56,3 +56,92 @@ def test_whitespace_is_stripped():
     # first; an unstripped key silently creates a second bucket per client.
     assert client_key(_Req({"x-forwarded-for": " 203.0.113.7 ,10.0.0.2"})) \
         == "203.0.113.7"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# The ceiling that header rotation cannot raise.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+
+@pytest.fixture()
+def api(monkeypatch):
+    from backend import app as app_module
+    from backend.config import settings
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "global_rate_limit_per_minute", 5)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(app_module, "_global_window", None)
+    return TestClient(app_module.app, raise_server_exceptions=False)
+
+
+
+def _ceiling_req(path: str, host: str):
+    """Enough of a Request for exempt_from_ceiling: a path and a peer host."""
+    return type("R", (), {
+        "url": type("U", (), {"path": path})(),
+        "client": type("C", (), {"host": host})(),
+    })()
+
+
+def _get(client, path="/api/flags", cf=None):
+    headers = {"cf-connecting-ip": cf} if cf else {}
+    return client.get(path, headers=headers)
+
+
+def test_rotating_the_cloudflare_header_cannot_buy_unlimited_requests(api):
+    """The attack the per-client keying opened up.
+
+    client_key trusts CF-Connecting-IP, and nothing in this process can tell an
+    edge-set header from an attacker-set one — that distinction can only be
+    made at Cloudflare, with Authenticated Origin Pulls or an origin firewall.
+    A caller reaching the origin directly can therefore mint a fresh
+    rate-limit bucket per request and evade per-client limits entirely.
+
+    Per-client fairness is still the right default; this is the backstop that
+    bounds what evading it can achieve. Without it, correct keying would be a
+    net regression against abuse compared with the shared bucket it replaced.
+    """
+    codes = [_get(api, cf=f"203.0.113.{i}").status_code for i in range(8)]
+    assert codes.count(200) == 5
+    assert codes.count(429) == 3
+
+
+def test_the_ceiling_says_which_limit_was_hit(api):
+    # Distinguishable from slowapi's per-client 429, or an operator reading
+    # logs cannot tell "one noisy client" from "the origin is saturated".
+    for i in range(5):
+        _get(api, cf=f"203.0.113.{i}")
+    refused = _get(api, cf="203.0.113.99")
+    assert refused.status_code == 429
+    assert "capacity" in refused.json()["detail"].lower()
+    assert refused.headers.get("retry-after")
+
+
+def test_traffic_below_the_ceiling_is_untouched(api):
+    codes = [_get(api, cf=f"203.0.113.{i}").status_code for i in range(5)]
+    assert codes == [200] * 5
+
+
+def test_the_container_healthcheck_is_exempt(api):
+    """The healthcheck runs `curl http://localhost:80/api/data-info` inside the
+    container. If the ceiling could starve it, saturation would fail the
+    healthcheck, restart the container, and turn a load spike into an outage
+    loop — the ceiling has to protect the origin, not kill it.
+    """
+    from backend.app import exempt_from_ceiling
+
+    assert exempt_from_ceiling(_ceiling_req("/api/data-info", "127.0.0.1"))
+    assert exempt_from_ceiling(_ceiling_req("/api/data-info", "::1"))
+    # Everyone else is counted.
+    assert not exempt_from_ceiling(_ceiling_req("/api/data-info", "10.0.0.9"))
+
+
+def test_the_ceiling_ignores_non_api_paths():
+    # Sitemaps and robots.txt are served by this app too, and a crawler
+    # fetching them must not be refused because the API is busy.
+    from backend.app import exempt_from_ceiling
+
+    assert exempt_from_ceiling(_ceiling_req("/sitemap.xml", "10.0.0.9"))
+    assert exempt_from_ceiling(_ceiling_req("/robots.txt", "10.0.0.9"))

backend/tests/test_suggest.py

@@ -126,3 +126,32 @@ def test_the_response_is_cacheable(monkeypatch):
     res = _client(monkeypatch, [_HIT]).get("/api/suggest?q=breck")
     assert "s-maxage" in res.headers.get("cache-control", "")
     assert res.headers.get("etag")
+
+
+def test_a_malformed_urn_does_not_raise(monkeypatch):
+    """The docstring promises "never raises"; the parsing loop sat outside the
+    try, so int(None) or int("abc") would have turned a keystroke into a 500.
+
+    Typesense declares urn as int32, so this should be unreachable — but the
+    contract is what the caller relies on, and a search index is a separate
+    system that can be reindexed by something other than this code.
+    """
+    _use(monkeypatch, _FakeClient([{"urn": None, "school_name": "X",
+                                    "local_authority": "Y", "postcode": "Z"}]))
+    assert data_loader.suggest_schools_typesense("x") == []
+
+
+def test_a_malformed_row_does_not_discard_the_good_ones(monkeypatch):
+    # One bad document must not blank the whole dropdown.
+    _use(monkeypatch, _FakeClient([
+        {"urn": "not-a-number", "school_name": "Bad", "local_authority": "Y",
+         "postcode": "Z"},
+        _HIT,
+    ]))
+    out = data_loader.suggest_schools_typesense("x")
+    assert [r["urn"] for r in out] == [100010]
+
+
+def test_a_hit_with_no_document_does_not_raise(monkeypatch):
+    _use(monkeypatch, _FakeClient([{}]))
+    assert data_loader.suggest_schools_typesense("x") == []